The Transition from Corporate Governance to Bankruptcy Governance – Convergence of German and US law?

Schillig Michael
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Schillig Michael: *Dr. iur., LL.M., Lecturer, King's College, London.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2010, vol. 7, issue 1, 116-157

Abstract: The recently established doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency’, as an independent cause of action and/or theory of damages, holds a defendant liable for causing an insolvent company to incur additional debt in order to sustain its life. Based on a comparative analysis of the German concept of liability for delaying formal insolvency proceedings and the doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency,’ this paper attempts to ascertain whether, and to what extent, convergence of German and US law can be observed in respect of the transition from corporate governance to bankruptcy governance.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.2010.116

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