Consequences of Uncertainty for Regulation: Law and Economics of the Financial Crisis

Pacces Alessio M.
Additional contact information
Pacces Alessio M.: *Associate Professor of Law and Economics, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam), and Research Associate, ECGI.

European Company and Financial Law Review, 2010, vol. 7, issue 4, 479-511

Abstract: This article analyzes the last financial crisis focussing on the recurrent dynamics of externalities in banking. It shows that two major determinants of the crisis were the uncertainty of a new form of financial intermediation and the failure of regulation to cope with its externalities. Differently from more standard explanations, which are based on opportunism and/or irrationality of financial institutions, this analysis suggests that regulation has not just been insufficient. Regulation has contributed to financial instability too, supporting fragile conventions to handle uncertainty and encouraging regulatory arbitrage through financial innovation.Three implications are derived from this analysis and contrasted with the ongoing reforms of financial regulation in the US and in the EU. First, regulatory arbitrage is better dealt with by protecting banking from disintermediation than by extending prudential regulation to non-banks. Maturity transformation should be defined functionally and reserved to banks. Second, a major danger with ratings is that they support false conventions of safety. To avoid this outcome, the relevance of ratings for regulatory purposes should be reduced and rating agencies should be deterred from rating without verifiable background knowledge. Third, in order to reduce short-termism, regulation of banks' corporate governance should rather question than reinforce managerial accountability to shareholders.

Keywords: Financial Crisis; Maturity Transformation; Externalities; Shadow Banking; Rating Agencies; Corporate Governance of Banks; Dodd-Frank Act; EU Financial Reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr.2010.479 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:eucflr:v:7:y:2010:i:4:p:479-511:n:1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ecfr/html

DOI: 10.1515/ecfr.2010.479

Access Statistics for this article

European Company and Financial Law Review is currently edited by Heribert Hirte

More articles in European Company and Financial Law Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().