A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model

Arnold Lutz G.
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Arnold Lutz G.: University of Regensburg,Regensburg, Germany

German Economic Review, 2012, vol. 13, issue 2, 211-227

Abstract: Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.

Keywords: Financial intermediation; asymmetric information; credit rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0475.2011.00552.x

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