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Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!

Alessandro Fedele and Paolo Naticchioni

German Economic Review, 2016, vol. 17, issue 2, 127-156

Abstract: We study self-selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.

Keywords: Motivation; moonlighting politicians; political selection; politicians’ effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12072

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