Contagion of Self-Interested Behavior: Evidence from Group Dictator Game Experiments

Ito Takehiro, Suzuki Akihiro, Takemoto Toru, Ogawa Kazuhito and Takahashi Hiromasa
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Ito Takehiro: Faculty of Policy Studies, Iwate Prefectural University, Sugo, Takizawa,Iwate, Japan
Suzuki Akihiro: Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University, Chome-4-12 Kojirakawamachi,Yamagata, Japan
Takemoto Toru: Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University, 7 Chome-1-1 Tezukayama,Nara, Japan
Ogawa Kazuhito: Center for Experimental Economics, Faculty of Sociology, Kansai University, 3 Chome-3-35 Yamatecho, Suita,Osaka, Japan
Takahashi Hiromasa: Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, 3 Chome-4-1 Ozukahigashi, Asaminami Ward,Hiroshima, Japan

German Economic Review, 2016, vol. 17, issue 4, 425-437

Abstract: We examine how group decision-making affects other-regarding behavior in experimental dictator games. In particular, we assess whether the effects of iterated games differ for group and individual decision-making and whether the difference in decision-making style (individual or group) changes the perception of social identity. We make two findings on group decision-making. First, group decisions become more selfish when repeating the game after changing group members. Second, a dictator group donates more to a recipient group at the same university than to a recipient group at a different university. These findings are not true for individual decision-making.

Keywords: Other-regarding behavior; dictator game experiments; group decision-making; repeated decision-making; social identity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12077

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