Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes

Sugata Marjit, Marcel Thum and Seidel André
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Seidel André: TU Dresden,Dresden, Germany

German Economic Review, 2017, vol. 18, issue 3, 283-301

Abstract: This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue-maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.

Keywords: Tax evasion; tax avoidance; corruption; enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes (2017)
Working Paper: Tax Evasion, Corruption and tax Loopholes (2016)
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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12107

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