Uncoupled Aspiration Adaptation Dynamics Into the Core

Nax Heinrich H.
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Nax Heinrich H.: Computational Social Science, ETH Zürich,Zürich, Germany

German Economic Review, 2019, vol. 20, issue 2, 243-256

Abstract: Dynamics for play of transferable-utility cooperative games are proposed that require information regarding own payoff experiences and other players’ past actions, but not regarding other players’ payoffs. The proposed dynamics provide an evolutionary interpretation of the proto-dynamic ‘blocking argument’ (Edgeworth, 1881) based on the behavioral principles of ‘aspiration adaptation’ (Sauermann and Selten, 1962) instead of best response. If the game has a non-empty core, the dynamics are absorbed into the core in finite time with probability one. If the core is empty, the dynamics cycle infinitely through all coalitions.

Keywords: Cooperative games; core; evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1111/geer.12160

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