Bid Functions in Auctions and Fair Division Games: Experimental Evidence

Güth Werner, Königstein Manfred, Ivanova-Stenzel Radosveta and Martin Strobel
Additional contact information
Güth Werner: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems,München, Germany
Königstein Manfred: Humboldt-University of Berlin,Berlin, Germany
Ivanova-Stenzel Radosveta: Humboldt-University of Berlin,Berlin, Germany

German Economic Review, 2002, vol. 3, issue 4, 461-484

Abstract: In auctions a seller offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue. In fair division games the object is collectively owned by the group of bidders who equally share the revenue. We run an experiment in which the participants face four types of allocation games (auctions and fair division game under two price rules, first- versus second-price rule). We collect entire bid functions rather than bids for single values and investigate price and efficiency of the different trading institutions. We find that the first-price auction is more efficient than the second-price auction, whereas economic rationality assuming heterogeneous bidders suggests the opposite. Furthermore, we study the structure of individual bid functions.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.00068 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Journal Article: Bid Functions in Auctions and Fair Division Games: Experimental Evidence (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:germec:v:3:y:2002:i:4:p:461-484

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ger/html

DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00068

Access Statistics for this article

German Economic Review is currently edited by Peter Egger, Almut Balleer, Jesus Crespo-Cuaresma, Mario Larch, Aderonke Osikominu and Georg Wamser

More articles in German Economic Review from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().