Design of the 3G Spectrum Auctions in the UK and Germany: An Experimental Investigation

Seifert Stefan and Ehrhart Karl-Martin
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Seifert Stefan: University of Karlsruhe,Karlsruhe, Germany
Ehrhart Karl-Martin: University of Karlsruhe,Karlsruhe, Germany

German Economic Review, 2005, vol. 6, issue 2, 229-248

Abstract: This paper analyses the auction designs chosen for awarding 3G licences in the UK and Germany and compares them with respect to revenues and bidders’ surplus using a laboratory experiment. In our study with a given number of bidders, the German design leads to higher revenues. However, bidder surplus in the German design is lower and bidders face a severe exposure problem. Because this might discourage participation, it will probably lead to less competitive bidding in real applications.

Keywords: Spectrum auctions; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-6485.2005.00128.x

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