Rational Irrationality Across Institutional Contexts

Ryan Murphy ()

Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 2015, vol. 21, issue 1-2, 67-78

Abstract: This paper considers how Bryan Caplan’s concept of rational irrationality may manifest in various political institutional arrangements, building off the demand curve for irrationality. Mob democracy, anarchy, autocracy, and constitutionally constrained democracy are the governance structures addressed. While anarchy is strictly better than mob democracy, under certain conditions, democracy, anarchy, or constitutionally constrained democracy may yield the best outcomes depending on the circumstances.

Keywords: rational irrationality; comparative institutional analysis; anarchy; autocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-2015-0005

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