The Sugar-Pie Game: The Case of Non-Conforming Expectations

Joseph Mullat ()

Mathematical Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 2, issue 1-2, 27-31

Abstract: Playing a bargaining game, the players with non-conforming expectations were trying to enlarge their share of a sugar-pie. The first player, who was not very keen on sweets, placed an emphasis on quality. In contrast, for the second player, all sweet options, whatever they might be, were open. Thus, this paper aims to determine the negotiating power of the first player, if equal division of the pie was desirable, i. e., both players aimed to get 1/2 of the available sweets.

Keywords: Game theory; bargaining power; non-conforming expectations; Game theory; bargaining power; non-conforming expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0017

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