 RegistriesMan and the Economy, 2014, vol. 1, issue 2, 209-230 Abstract: Governments and international development agencies often fail in their efforts to build and reform property and company registries. They implement misguided policies rooted in a poor understanding of the role that registries play in the modern economy. This work aims to remedy this situation by first presenting a theory of registries as market-enabling institutions which, by making private contracts verifiable by judges, enable truly impersonal (i.e., asset-based, in rem) trade without endangering property enforcement. The theory is then applied to discuss and guide major policy decisions that reformers face in the areas of land titling and business formalization, emphasizing the principle of registry independence, identifying courts as the key users of registries, clarifying the main choices of titling and formalization projects, and pointing out the presence of diseconomies of scope between contractual and administrative registries. Keywords: property rights; land policy; land titling; registries; transaction costs; foreclosure crisis; business formalization; impersonal exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:maneco:v:1:y:2014:i:2:p:22:n:1 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1515/me-2014-0016 Access Statistics for this article Man and the Economy is currently edited by Ning Wang More articles in Man and the Economy from De Gruyter |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.