Cooperative Authoritarians and Regime Stability

Fuller Clay Robert ()
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Fuller Clay Robert: Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, Gambrell Hall, Columbia, SC 29208-0001, USA

New Global Studies, 2017, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-28

Abstract: This article assumes that the post-cold war unipolar global power structure marked the beginnings of a two-level game of national survival involving an international process of “othering,” where the winning democracies and their leaders (the “West”) view many non-democracies and their leaders as threats that they must convert, subjugate, or eradicate. Using new data on special economic zones (SEZs), I find that geographically restricting economic liberalization and reducing competition from opposition parties increases authoritarian stability and durability in this new environment.

Keywords: special economic zones; authoritarianism; regime stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1515/ngs-2017-0009

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