Mehr Beschäftigung, weniger Arbeitslosigkeit: Setzt sich das ökonomische Gesetz gegen (verbands-)politische Macht durch?
Berthold Norbert
ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2000, vol. 51, issue 1, 231-260
Abstract:
For the last 25 years the performance of the German labor market has tremendously deteriorated. This development is caused by severe shortcomings due to an institutional mismatch. A widespread network of regulations between the labor market, the welfare state and the fiscal federalism setting is prompting collective moral hazard by trade unions and employer associations and prevents market forces from achieving high employment equilibrium. Unfortunately the current situation is a politico-economic equilibrium since the majority obstructs the necessary institutional reforms. Proposed solutions embracing interest groups like the „Bündnis für Arbeit“ are a cul-de-sac. In this respect globalization is a remedy. Increasing international trade and factor mobility lead to more heterogeneity of interests and strengthen the voice of those who engage for decentralisation, differentiation and competition.
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2000-0111 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:51:y:2000:i:1:p:231-260:n:11
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ordo/html
DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2000-0111
Access Statistics for this article
ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft is currently edited by Christian Müller
More articles in ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().