Direkte Volksrechte und die Effizienz des demokratischen Staates

Gebhard Kirchgässner

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2001, vol. 52, issue 1, 155-174

Abstract: This paper reports evidence from Switzerland which indicates that a democracy with direct popular rights is at least not less efficient than a democracy without such rights: The citizens are better informed and the (economic) policy decisions are taken in a way that economic welfare is higher and the political outcome corresponds closer to the demands of the citizens than in a purely representative system. Correspondingly, reported subjective personal well being is positively related to the existence of direct popular rights. This holds despite the fact that the Swiss democracy is largely unlimited and, correspondingly, even less consistent with the views of F.A. v. Hayek about a reasonable design of a democracy than nearly all purely representative systems. Finally, the different philosophical ideas which lie behind F.A. v. Hayek’s conception of a democracy and the Swiss constitutional reality are shortly discussed.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2001-0111

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