Wer entscheidet über Leitzinssatzänderungen?: Zur optimalen Verfassung des Zentralbankrats in einer Währungsunion

Vollmer Uwe

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2004, vol. 55, issue 1, 287-312

Abstract: The paper presents central bank constitutions in eleven federal states or federation of states and discusses how monetary policy decisions should be organized in a monetary union. Three aspects are analyzed: the size of the central bank council, including the majority rule applied, the weighting of council members’ votes, and the co-existence of centrally and decentrally appointed members. The paper shows that central bank councils should be small and that individual votes should be weighted according to the economic significance of the region that a member of the council represents.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2004-0116

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