Zentralbanken zwischen staatlichem Machtanspruch und Stabilitätsinteresse / Central banks between government power and stability interest

Görgens Egon and Ruckriegel Karlheinz

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2007, vol. 58, issue 1, 17-32

Abstract: Central banks were frequently used by their governments as instruments for a monetary policy reducing national debt by inflation. On the other hand it must be seen that central banks as lenders of last resort helped to prevent and contain financial disruptions. Perceiving this role - and avoiding inflationary pressures - two conditions must be fulfilled, a technical and especially an institutional one. Technically die banks must be tied to the cen­tral bank. Institutionally the central bank needs political autonomy in pursuing exclusively assigned objectives, especially price stability. In this paper it will be shown that the institu­tional prerequisites of the Eurosystem are superior to those of the US Federal Reserve System.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2007-0104

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