Wege zu mehr Steuerehrlichkeit / Towards a Better Tax Compliance

Charles Blankart

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2008, vol. 59, issue 1, 63-90

Abstract: Individuals pay taxes because they trust in government. Governments’ adherence to the rule of law seems to increase trust and tax compliance. But the tax design also influences tax compliance. Taxes for which the quid pro quo is not visible or which are not self determined by the citizenry are more likey to be evaded. VAT according to the origin principle fares better than VAT according the destination principle. Tax design should keep revenue in balance with enforcement costs, efficiency loss and citizen’s trust in government. Questionable are extremely high tax rates, such as those on long term savings.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2008-0107 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:59:y:2008:i:1:p:63-90:n:7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/ordo/html

DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2008-0107

Access Statistics for this article

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft is currently edited by Christian Müller

More articles in ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().