Das Elend mit den zu kurzen politischen Zeithorizonten / The misery with time frames that are too short

Hamm Walter

ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2013, vol. 64, issue 1, 445-458

Abstract: A defect of democratic decision-making lies in the pressure of interest groups on politicians when competing for election votes. Politicians promise monetary benefits at public expense. Thinking in legislative periods favours acting within time frames which are too short. Different causes and forms of appearance of short-term thinking and acting are discussed in this article as well as possible countermeasures. A special focus is on institutions such as central banks which are not (yet) a subject to governmental orders. The lower the governmental interventions on markets are the smaller are the contact points for the influence of interest groups. Legislator′s responsibility to estimate long-term impacts for all actions and to expose predictions to public criticism can protect the next generation from serious burdens.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2013-0121

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