The Shapley Value as a Guide to FRAND Licensing Agreements

Pierre Dehez () and Poukens Sophie ()
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Poukens Sophie: CORE, University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Review of Law & Economics, 2014, vol. 10, issue 3, 265-284

Abstract: We consider the problem faced by standard-setting organizations of specifying Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) agreements. Along with Layne-Farrar et al. (2007. “Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments.” 74 Antitrust Law Journal 671–706), we model the problem as a cooperative game with transferable utility, allowing for patents that have substitutes. Assuming that a value has been assigned to these “weak” patents, we obtain a formula for the Shapley value that gives an insight into what FRAND agreements could look like.

Keywords: patent licensing; Shapley value; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements (2014)
Working Paper: The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements (2013)
Working Paper: The Shapley value as a guide to FRAND licensing agreements (2013)
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2013-0016

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