EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Bottlenecks or Inefficiency? An Assessment of First Instance Italian Courts’ Performance

Massimo Finocchiaro Castro and Calogero Guccio ()

Review of Law & Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 2, 317-354

Abstract: The efficiency and effectiveness of judicial systems has become one of the main points of interest in public sector administration, due to the beneficial effects of an efficient judicial system on economic growth and firm competition. This is particularly relevant in Italy where judicial proceedings are extremely long-lasting due to the huge (in)efficiency of courts and to the presence of bottlenecks that affect the efficient management of court activity. This paper attempts to measure the relative technical efficiency of Italian first instance courts in the period 2010–2011 by applying a non-parametric frontier and distinguishing between managerial (in)efficiency and (in)efficiency due to the non-discretionary caseload. Our findings show that, while the presence of bottlenecks in the caseload plays a role in the level of court inefficiency, this effect is relatively small compared with the inefficiency due to the lack of managerial ability to efficiently manage both the backlog and increases in filings. Furthermore, this outcome is more relevant in the South rather than in the North of the country. Finally, our empirical findings are robust to an alternative estimator and sample variation.

Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2015.11.issue ... -0030.xml?format=INT (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:317-354:n:9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().

 
Page updated 2020-10-12
Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:317-354:n:9