The Deterrence Effects of Gun Laws in Games with Asymmetric Skills and Information

Cristiano Oliveira and Balbinotto Neto Giácomo ()
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Balbinotto Neto Giácomo: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS, Avenida João, Pessoa, 52 - Centro, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil

Review of Law & Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 3, 435-452

Abstract: This paper presents a game-theoretic model of crime and self-defense with gun use. The main purpose is to evaluate gun control policy effectiveness on crime reduction. The effects of assumption regarding the type of information agent’s possess and some extensions such as criminals’ skills advantage and different costs in gun carrying are studied. The results show that policies that increase gun availability make criminals always carry guns, even if they have a fighting advantage over the victims. The main conclusions are that gun control under complete information assumption leads to a decrease of gun crimes and that such policies are more effective to reduce crime when they affect both criminal’s and victim’s costs. Under incomplete information gun control generates multiple equilibria where criminals alternate between crimes with and without guns. In this case the effects of gun policy on crime depend on the share of population type.

Keywords: gun control; crime; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2012-0016

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