Day-Fines: Should the Rich Pay More?

Kantorowicz-Reznichenko Elena ()
Additional contact information
Kantorowicz-Reznichenko Elena: Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics (RILE), Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Review of Law & Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 3, 481-501

Abstract: Fines are an efficient method of sanctioning since the burden on the taxpayer for enforcing it is low and the offender is transferring wealth to society. However, using law-and-economics analysis, this paper suggests that the day-fine is a superior model to other forms of fines. This pecuniary measure takes into account the income of the offender and the severity of the offense. Consequently, criminals with different socioeconomic status committing the same crime would pay the same portion of their wealth but not the same absolute amount of money. Using this structure, the day-fine has a potential to deter equally both the rich and the poor and to avoid the costly sanction of imprisonment.

Keywords: day-fines; sanctions; criminal law; deterrence; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2014-0045 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:481-501:n:7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2014-0045

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().