Convergence of Legal Rules: Comparing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Processes

Crettez Bertrand (), Deffains Bruno () and Olivier Musy
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Crettez Bertrand: CRED, Paris Center for Law & Economics, University Panthéon-Assas Paris II, Paris, France
Deffains Bruno: CRED, Paris Center for Law & Economics, University Panthéon-Assas Paris II, Paris, France

Review of Law & Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 1, 13-35

Abstract: Legal scholars distinguish two modes of international legal cooperation: minimum legal harmonization and full harmonization (i.e. legal unification). These cooperative choices imply more or less stringent requirements and are opposed to non cooperative, unilateral legal changes. This paper is an attempt to model these alternative modes of legal adjustments and to compare their properties regarding legal convergence. We show that all arrangements can lead to legal uniformity. We also show that decentralized processes can be better than more centralized arrangements.

Keywords: law-and-economics; legal competition; legal transplants; legal harmonization; legal unification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2014-0016

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