How Can Eurobonds Be Legally Implemented into European Law?

Kämmerer Jörn Axel ()
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Kämmerer Jörn Axel: Bucerius Law School, 20355 Hamburg, Germany

Review of Law & Economics, 2016, vol. 12, issue 3, 585-604

Abstract: This contribution examines to what extent and under what conditions the various proposals for Eurobonds may be considered to be in accordance with European law (especially Art. 125 TFEU) and the national (constitutional) law of the Member States. It finds that their admissibility primarily depends on the degree to which these proposals would be able to curb debtor moral hazard, which in turn depends on the liability regime chosen: joint and several or pro rata liability. We conclude that most types of Eurobonds would require a Treaty amendment, whose political feasibility is questionable.

Keywords: Eurobonds; TFEU; sovereign debt; moral hazard; bailout (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 H63 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:12:y:2016:i:3:p:585-604:n:6

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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0044

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