Enforcement and Deterrence in Merger Control: The Case of Merger Remedies

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Lars Sørgard

Review of Law & Economics, 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, 22

Abstract: This paper deals with the enforcement of merger control in the presence of remedies, and studies how merger remedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and find that when conditional approvals are possible, it may be harder to deter the most welfare-detrimental mergers, and the agency might have to investigate mergers more often. Furthermore, we find that remedies may very well decrease welfare. Finally, we show that our theoretical results help to understand some of the empirical findings in the literature.

Keywords: merger control; merger remedies; enforcement; deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Working Paper: Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare? (2014)
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0014

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