Utility Misperception in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Bienenstock Sophie ()
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Bienenstock Sophie: Economics, CRED, Paris, France

Review of Law & Economics, 2018, vol. 14, issue 3, 43

Abstract: When choosing between two goods, consumers anticipate the utility they expect to derive from each product. However, such anticipations are subject to several sources of error, such as quality or price misperception and overoptimism about one’s capacity to use a product. The present paper studies the effect of inaccurate utility anticipations on consumer choice and ultimately on the market outcome in a vertically differentiated duopoly. I come to the conclusion that utility misperception can lead consumers to make suboptimal decisions ex post, although the choice seemed rational at the time of purchase. I show that in a vertically differentiated duopoly, firms are subject to two opposite incentives regarding consumer education. Moreover, the firms’ incentives to educate consumers are not necessarily aligned with the socially efficient outcome. Therefore, this paper also explores several policies aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of consumer misperception.

Keywords: consumer bias; consumer policy; behavioral law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0047

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