Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control: The Case of Going Private

Ofir Moran ()
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Ofir Moran: Radzyner Law School, The Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel

Review of Law & Economics, 2019, vol. 15, issue 1, 17

Abstract: I analyze the legal rules governing the sale-of-corporate-control in the case of going private transactions and examine whether a controlling shareholder must share the premium associated with sale-of-control. I rely on the framework developed in (Bebchuk, L.A. 1994. “Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control,” 109 Quarterly Journal of Economics 957–993) regarding these transactions under the adjusted market rule (AMR) enabling different rights for the controlling and minority shareholders, and under the adjusted equal opportunity rule (AEOR) providing equal rights to the minorities and controller. My main findings are that both rules prevent inefficient transfers, since under both the new controller fully internalizes the externality imposed by extracting private benefits of control. However, the AMR is superior in facilitating efficient transfers. This is because the AEOR can prevent efficient transfers, due to the higher price demanded from the buyer in order to compensate both controller and minorities. In consequence, overall, the AMR dominates the AEOR for transactions in which a company is taken private.

Keywords: sale of control; control premium; going private; market rule; equal opportunity rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2017-0015

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