Gang Rivalry and Crime: A Differential Game Approach

Joao Faria, Franklin Mixon, Upadhyaya Ashish and Kamal Upadhyaya
Additional contact information
Upadhyaya Ashish: School of Health Sciences, University of New Haven, West Haven, CT06516, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2019, vol. 15, issue 2, 30

Abstract: This study contributes to the modern literature on the economics of crime by proposing and solving two models of a differential game that considers the dynamic strategic behavior of two gangs engaged in a territorial conflict. The police force acts as the leader in the game. In the first model, each gang is concerned solely by the actions of the other, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the greater one gang’s criminal activity, the greater the rival gang’s criminal activity. In the second model both gangs account primarily for police activities aimed at maintaining law and order, thus leading to an equilibrium wherein the gangs respond directly to the law enforcement activities of the police force. Exploratory analyses employing gang-related crime and police activities in Los Angeles provide empirical support for the main features of both models of the differential game, such as how gang rivalry fuels criminal activity and how the role of police is crucial in reducing gang-related crime.

Keywords: gang-related crime; gang rivalry; police enforcement; differential games; economics of crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D00 D74 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0017 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:15:y:2019:i:2:p:30:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0017

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().