A Rule of Reason Approach for Passive Minority Interests within the European Union

Zevgolis Nikolaos E. () and Panagiotis Fotis
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Zevgolis Nikolaos E.: Commissioner, Hellenic Competition Commission, 7 Gavriilidou street 11141, Athens, Greece

Review of Law & Economics, 2019, vol. 15, issue 3, 41

Abstract: In this interdisciplinary paper we analyze the anticompetitive effects and the practicability and applicability of passive (non-controlling) minority interests within the existing Merger Regulation system [Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation), OJ L 24/1]. The empirical evidences from existing economic literature and case law show that the existence of an enforcement gap in European Union competition law regarding the anticompetitive effects of non-controlling minority interests has not been confirmed so far. Therefore, there is no space, at least to date, for a per se ruling in the European Union Law for the assessment of passive minority interests, but for a Rule of Reason approach, based on a case by case analysis. The Commission should continue to investigate non-controlling transactions and, in the future, an ex post assessment/quantification of their anticompetitive effects, based on existing (or settled) case law and economic theory, should be at the core of its agenda.

Keywords: passive minority interests; merger regulation; case law; oligopoly theory; European commission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0041

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