The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance

Mungan Murat C. ()
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Mungan Murat C.: George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Arlington, Virginia 22201-4426, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2020, vol. 16, issue 1, 7

Abstract: Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also lowers the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.

Keywords: standard of proof; avoidance; audit; deterrence; evidence; judicial error (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2019-0019

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