Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms

Dargaud Emilie () and Armel Jacques
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Dargaud Emilie: Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE, UMR 5824, F-69130Ecully, France

Review of Law & Economics, 2020, vol. 16, issue 3, 39

Abstract: When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.

Keywords: collusion; antitrust policy; leniency programs; multimarket contact; organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 L22 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2018-0060

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