A Simple Model of Corporate Fiduciary Duties: With an Application to Corporate Compliance

Bunting William C. ()
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Bunting William C.: Department of Business Law, Fox School of Business and Management, Temple University, 1801 Liacouras Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2021, vol. 17, issue 3, 583-614

Abstract: This article models the duty of care as a response to moral hazard where the principal seeks to induce effort that is costly to the agent and unobservable by the principal. The duty of loyalty, by contrast, is modeled as a response to adverse selection where the principal seeks truthful disclosure of private information held by the agent. This model of corporate loyalty differs importantly with standard adverse selection models, however, in that the principal cannot use available contracting variables as a screening mechanism to ensure honest disclosure and must rely upon the use of an external third-party audit technology, such as the court system. This article extends the model to the issue of corporate compliance and argues that the optimal judicial approach would define the duty to monitor as a subset of due care – and not loyalty – but hold that the usual legal protections provided for due care violations no longer apply.

Keywords: corporate governance; fiduciary duties; corporate compliance; asymmetric information; D82; G34; K22; O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2021-0013

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