Mechanisms Underlying Familial Influence on Elite Political Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals

Lempert Daniel () and Camacho Alyse ()
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Lempert Daniel: Department of Politics, SUNY Potsdam, Potsdam, USA
Camacho Alyse: Politics Department, SUNY Potsdam, Potsdam, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2022, vol. 18, issue 1, 55-68

Abstract: This article contributes to the literature addressing family influences on elite political behavior. By empirically assessing the influence of sibling gender on judicial decision-making, we are able to present evidence on the mechanism by which child, sibling and other relatives’ gender may influence elite political behavior. We build on a published dataset by mining various archival sources to compile data on the gender of judges’ siblings. We find no evidence that male judges’ votes on so-called “women’s issues” (employment discrimination based on gender or pregnancy, reproductive rights/abortion, and Title IX) are affected by whether they have a sister, and we are able to rule out large effects of a sibling’s gender on male and female judges’ votes. Our results imply that the relationship between family member gender and elite political behavior is driven by the desire to avoid costs of discrimination, rather than learning from family members.

Keywords: siblings; U.S. courts; learning; costs of discrimination; judicial decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2020-0042

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