People Want Optimal Deterrence – Just a Little Bit

Kłusek Michał ()
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Kłusek Michał: University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland

Review of Law & Economics, 2023, vol. 19, issue 1, 99-113

Abstract: Psychological studies of punitive intuitions demonstrate that the economic theory of optimal deterrence is fundamentally counterintuitive. We punish in response to the moral blameworthiness of the crime with little regard for the consequences. But it is less clear whether optimal deterrence is acceptable. When the law is not accepted by the community it governs, its crime control efficiency suffers. If optimal deterrence is wholly unacceptable, then it is counterproductive as a guide to penal policy. I administered an online survey to university students to examine the acceptability of different applications of optimal deterrence theory. The participants rejected nearly all of the applications, with the sole exception of an increase in punishment severity on the general policy level. They were also more willing to accept smaller, rather than bigger, changes of punishment severity; and increases, rather than decreases of punishment. The results suggest penal policy may be slightly adjusted in the direction suggested by economic analysis of criminal law without a major loss to the law’s moral credibility – especially if the adjustment involves an increase in punishment magnitude.

Keywords: punishment; optimal deterrence; empirical desert; experimental law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2022-0050

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