Pricing Legal Options: A Behavioral Perspective

Bar-Gill Oren
Additional contact information
Bar-Gill Oren: New York University School of Law

Review of Law & Economics, 2005, vol. 1, issue 2, 204-240

Abstract: Many legal rules can be interpreted as creating options. Option pricing is thus important for understanding the ex ante effects of these rules. And, recognizing that individuals, whose behavior the law aims to influence, are imperfectly rational, a behavioral option pricing model is a potentially helpful tool for legal policy. This paper develops such a model and applies it to a series of legal problems in tort law, contract law, corporate law and criminal law.

Keywords: Options; behavioral law and economics; optimism; overconfidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1555-5879.1016 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:1:y:2005:i:2:n:2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1016

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().