EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reimagining Antitrust Institutions: A (Modest?) Proposal

Ginsburg Douglas H. and Wright Joshua D. ()
Additional contact information
Ginsburg Douglas H.: 25800 George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School , Arlington, VA, USA
Wright Joshua D.: Lodestar Law and Econoomics, Mclean, VA, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, issue 1, 83-155

Abstract: It is always an appropriate time to reevaluate, reexamine, and question the optimal scope and shape of antitrust institutions. In this article we ask whether the complex current distribution of competition functions in the U.S. can be improved by some reorganization or other reform. We answer in the affirmative and propose a number of improvements – perhaps the most significant being consolidating the competition functions of the FTC into the Antitrust Division and stripping the FCC of authority independently to review mergers, as it did in view of the similarly poor performance of the DOT when reviewing airline mergers. Our more general proposal with the authority of sectoral regulators over competition should not be overlooked, however; it would do much good with little or no downside.

Keywords: antitrust; federal trade commission; antitrust division; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K23 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0090 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:20:y:2024:i:1:p:83-155:n:1006

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0090

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:20:y:2024:i:1:p:83-155:n:1006