Reimagining Antitrust Institutions: A (Modest?) Proposal
Ginsburg Douglas H. and
Wright Joshua D. ()
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Ginsburg Douglas H.: 25800 George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School , Arlington, VA, USA
Wright Joshua D.: Lodestar Law and Econoomics, Mclean, VA, USA
Review of Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, issue 1, 83-155
Abstract:
It is always an appropriate time to reevaluate, reexamine, and question the optimal scope and shape of antitrust institutions. In this article we ask whether the complex current distribution of competition functions in the U.S. can be improved by some reorganization or other reform. We answer in the affirmative and propose a number of improvements – perhaps the most significant being consolidating the competition functions of the FTC into the Antitrust Division and stripping the FCC of authority independently to review mergers, as it did in view of the similarly poor performance of the DOT when reviewing airline mergers. Our more general proposal with the authority of sectoral regulators over competition should not be overlooked, however; it would do much good with little or no downside.
Keywords: antitrust; federal trade commission; antitrust division; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K23 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:20:y:2024:i:1:p:83-155:n:1006
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0090
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