The Disavowal of Decisionism: Politically Motivated Exits from the U.S. Courts of Appeals

Chen Daniel L. and Reinhart Eric ()
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Chen Daniel L.: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse, France
Reinhart Eric: Anthropologist and Resident Physician, Physician Training Scientist Program, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, issue 2, 289-321

Abstract: The impartiality and apolitical nature of the American judiciary are key to its legitimacy and the liberal constitutional legal system it supports. Though less than 1 % of U.S. Federal judges admit to political motivations for retirement or resignation, our research suggests these influences are more widespread. Examining data from 1802 to 2019, we found 11 % of retirements and 23 % of resignations from the U.S. Courts of Appeals may be linked to political cycles. Judges are less likely to retire before a Presidential election when the President is from a different party than their appointing party, and more likely to resign after the election if the President is from their appointing party. These politically motivated exits have grown, accounting for 14 % of retirements since 1975, which points to a more politically charged and polarized judiciary. Previous studies relying on self-reports or annual analyses have missed these political dynamics in judges’ departure timing. Our quarter-to-election level analysis reveals that significant decisions by Federal judges may often be influenced by unconscious bias or conscious partisan loyalty, both of which challenge the idea of judicial neutrality and the common law precedents judges must uphold. Our findings support growing concerns about undemocratic political power being exercised through the courts, giving rise to juristocracy – the practice of engaging in politics under the guise of legal proceedings.

Keywords: judicial tenure; political polarization; juristocracy; legitimacy; court reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 K00 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2024-0044

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