The Social Costs of Deregulation in a Fight Against Corruption: A Case Study on Driver’s Licenses in Mexico City
Grabiszewski Konrad () and
Horenstein Alex ()
Additional contact information
Grabiszewski Konrad: HEC Paris in Qatar, Doha, Qatar
Horenstein Alex: Department of Economics, 5452 University of Miami , Coral Gables, USA
Review of Law & Economics, 2024, vol. 20, issue 3, 341-355
Abstract:
Various anti-corruption tools have been proposed in the literature. In this article, we focus on deregulation. By removing red tape, the opportunities for bribery are reduced. At the same time, however, social costs can increase due to reemergence of inefficiencies that the regulation was intended to target in the first place. We analyze data from Mexico City, where a driving test was abolished to combat petty corruption prevalent in testing centers. A natural concern is that roads would become more dangerous. We find that this concern appears to be unwarranted; if anything, roads seem to have become safer.
Keywords: anti-corruption; deregulation; driving license; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H11 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2023-0104 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:20:y:2024:i:3:p:341-355:n:1001
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html
DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0104
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi
More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().