Revival Churches Abuses and Well-Being in Cameroon

Mpabe Bodjongo Mathieu Juliot ()
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Mpabe Bodjongo Mathieu Juliot: Public economics, Faculty of Economics and Management of University of Dschang, Dschang, Cameroon

Review of Law & Economics, 2025, vol. 21, issue 1, 121-146

Abstract: This paper examines how individuals value the establishment of a regulatory mechanism for revival churches (RCs). The analysis focuses on a sample of 1,475 individuals living in the Cameroonian cities of Yaoundé and Douala, based on a field survey. Drawing on theoretical and empirical literature, particularly in the fields of economics of religion, regulatory economics, and experimental economics, the econometric results obtained using the choice experiment method and a nested logit model show that individuals are in favor of setting up a mechanism to reduce the abuses of revival churches having as attributes: (i) “the census of RCs and their pastors”, (ii) the closure of RCs whose pastors have not received theological training from an accredited school, and (iii) the closure of rented RCs. These people are willing to pay 176 XAF for “the census of RCs and their pastors”, 140 XAF for “the closure of RCs where pastors have not received theological training from an accredited school”, and 253 XAF for “the closure of rented RCs”.

Keywords: religion market imperfection; well-being; market regulation; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 C51 D23 D43 D82 H10 Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2024-0035

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