Bias, Trust, and Trustworthiness: An Experimental Study of Post Justice System Outcomes

Ralston Jason (), Aimone Jason (), North Charles () and Rentschler Lucas ()
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Ralston Jason: Department of Economics, 8233 Whitman College , 99362-2067, Walla Walla, WA, USA
Aimone Jason: Department of Economics, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA
North Charles: Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA
Rentschler Lucas: Department of Economics, Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 249-281

Abstract: The stigma attached to any criminal record, including for those found not guilty, can lead to reduced job prospects and economic hardship long after judicial proceedings conclude. This paper examines discriminatory behavior of experimental participants who are given the opportunity to base an investment or employment decision on their trustee’s/worker’s criminal record. Similar to the real world, our experiment shows that employers and investors discriminate against those with criminal convictions. Surprisingly, we find they also discriminate against those with acquittals. We find that a subject’s reciprocity corresponds significantly to the true guilt or innocence of an accused, but not to conviction or acquittal of a crime. Because reciprocator behavior does not depend on a person’s criminal record, no rational basis exists for the observed statistical discrimination against those who have been accused. Our results raise serious concerns about the practice of using criminal records in hiring, as convictions are often poor indicators of actual culpability.

Keywords: experiment; criminal justice; bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D90 D91 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2024-0053

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