Redistribution and Crime When Agents Have Limited Liability: A Note

Alberto Cassone () and Carla Marchese ()

Review of Law & Economics, 2006, vol. 2, issue 2, 193-208

Abstract: Monetary sanctions are less effective when agents cannot afford to pay them in full. We present a simple model of a society with two types of risk averse agents, differing in terms of productivity in the legal labor market. We consider transfers from the most productive to the least productive agents, and discuss the conditions under which redistribution can reduce crime.

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1035

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