Nuisance Suits and Contingent Attorney Fees

Zhiqi Chen

Review of Law & Economics, 2006, vol. 2, issue 3, 363-370

Abstract: We demonstrate that contingent attorney fees can play a strategic role in a model of nuisance suits. Specifically, the use of contingency fees makes the plaintiff's threat to go to trial credible. In contrast to previous economic analyses, we show that contingency fees do encourage nuisance suits.

Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1045

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