Optimal Law Enforcement when the Offender can Dispose of his Wealth

Jeong-Yoo Kim

Review of Law & Economics, 2007, vol. 3, issue 2, 221-229

Abstract: In this paper we assert that, if an offender can dispose of some or all of his wealth after violating the law, raising the fine up to his wealth level will induce him to dispose of his wealth, thereby increasing social cost without deterring more offenses. This suggests that the socially optimal fine should be set below the offender's maximum wealth level.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1074

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