Protecting Private Property with Constitutional Judicial Review: A Social Welfare Approach

Grossman Peter Z. and Cole Daniel H.
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Grossman Peter Z.: Butler University; Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis
Cole Daniel H.: Butler University; Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis

Review of Law & Economics, 2009, vol. 5, issue 1, 233-250

Abstract: This article uses a social welfare approach to determine if and when the institution of constitutional judicial review of property regulation and expropriation is efficient. A model is proposed in which property rights protection is a component of social costs. Constitutional judicial review is assumed to either add to or subtract on net from those costs, affecting social welfare generally. It will be shown that under realistic conditions, reflected in real instances, that constitutional judicial review might not enhance economic efficiency or overall social welfare. We show that the efficiency of constitutional judicial review is likely to vary within the larger institutional context.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1309

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