Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three Strikes

Alexander Tabarrok and Helland Eric
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Helland Eric: George Mason University; Claremont-McKenna College/RAND

Review of Law & Economics, 2009, vol. 5, issue 1, 251-268

Abstract: California's Attorney General was pleased to announce that "An unintended but positive consequence of 'Three-Strikes' has been the impact on parolees leaving the state....The growth in the number of parolees leaving California is staggering." Law enforcement officers in other states were presumably less pleased. A displaced criminal is a benefit to California but a cost to other states. If such criminal spillovers are important, law enforcement will over-invest in policies that encourage displacement. We test whether California's three-strikes law led to significant criminal spillovers.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1326

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