Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments

Phil Curry and Steeve Mongrain

Review of Law & Economics, 2009, vol. 5, issue 1, 723-740

Abstract: In a tournament competitors may cheat to gain an advantage. This paper considers the problem of deterrence and finds that tournaments reflect special circumstances that are not present in a traditional model of law enforcement. The traditional model considers sanctions and monitoring as the instruments of deterrence. In a tournament the prize structure plays a critical role in determining both the costs and benefits to cheating. We consider ways in which the prize structure can be manipulated in order to reduce monitoring costs.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Working Paper: Deterrence in Rank-Order Tournaments (2007)
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1338

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