Settling with Multiple Litigants

Alper Nakkas

Review of Law & Economics, 2010, vol. 6, issue 1, 125-144

Abstract: This paper considers a class of complete information pretrial settlement bargaining games in which externalities can naturally arise due to the existence of multiple litigants. As opposed to earlier literature, it is shown that parties can always settle even though there are bargaining externalities.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1392

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