The Problem of Social Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase

Harold Demsetz

Review of Law & Economics, 2011, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: This essay discusses and refutes allegations by A.C. Pigou and R.H. Coase that a competitive, private-ownership economic system that conforms to the neoclassical model fails to allocate resources efficiently. The essay then suggests a source of inefficiency that differs from and is much more limited in application than are those offered by Pigou and Coase; and the suggested source, moreover, is compatible with the neoclassical model.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1502

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