Stealing within Marriage: Differences across Divorce Laws

Hanlon Michael
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Hanlon Michael: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, University of Washington

Review of Law & Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 1, 161-179

Abstract: I consider individuals’ incentive to engage in Pareto inefficient behavior towards their spouse, which I envision as stealing within marriage. Under unilateral divorce, I predict this incentive is lower for some individuals, and higher for no one. Therefore, the incentive to steal within marriage is lower, in aggregate. Empirically, I find unilateral states have 80% more marriage and family therapists, ceteris paribus. If therapists are a mechanism to reduce stealing within marriage, then this evidence is consistent with the theory.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1595

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